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Recent Criminal Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2005-2006 Term
Charles Whitebread

I

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the majority in United
States v. Grubbs,1 which held that anticipatory warrants do not
violate the Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable
cause to believe that contraband or evidence of crime will be
found in a particular place when the warrant is executed.
Justices Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg concurred in part but
believed the court erred when it held that an anticipatory warrant does not need to state the contingency intended by the
magistrate to trigger authorization.
Jeffrey Grubbs purchased a child pornography videotape
from a Web site run by an undercover postal inspector. The
Postal Inspection Service arranged for a controlled delivery of
the videotape to Grubbs’s residence and applied for a search
warrant proposing that the search warrant would not be executed “unless and until the parcel has been received by a person(s) and has been physically taken into the residence.” The
magistrate judge issued the warrant and the controlled delivery proceeded. The postal inspectors executed the warrant,
giving Grubbs a copy of the warrant, which included two
attachments that described the places to be searched and the
things to be seized, but not the affidavit that explained when
the warrant would be executed. Grubbs moved to exclude the
evidence, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to
list the triggering condition. The district court denied the
motion and the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The Court begins its analysis by concluding that anticipatory
warrants are not categorically unconstitutional. Most anticipatory warrants have conditions precedent to their execution and,
if executed before that condition occurs, “probable cause has

not yet been satisfied when the warrant is issued.” The Court
rejects the argument, however, that this condition precedent
makes anticipatory warrants a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the Court, “[p]robable cause exists
when there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” Therefore, all warrants are “anticipatory” because the requirement of probable
cause focuses on whether evidence will be discovered “when
the search is conducted.” The Fourth Amendment only calls
for two additional requirements for anticipatory warrants to be
valid: (1) “if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place”; and (2) “that there is probable cause that the
triggering condition will occur.”
The majority also believes that the Fourth Amendment does
not require the anticipatory warrant to specify the triggering
condition. The Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must be ‘particularly described’ in the warrant: the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
The Court declines to expand these requirements to include
the conditions precedent to the execution of a warrant.
In Georgia v. Randolph,2 a 5-3 Court held that even if a cooccupant consents to a warrantless search, if the other occupant is present and expressly denies the police permission to
enter the premises, the search is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Souter delivered the opinion
while Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas
filed dissenting opinions. Justice Alito took no part in the
decision.
Respondent’s wife called police to complain about a domestic dispute. She also accused her husband of using cocaine.
Respondent’s wife consented to a search of the house while
respondent, who was present, expressly refused the police permission to enter. The police found a drinking straw with
cocaine residue. Respondent’s wife subsequently withdrew her
consent, but the police obtained a warrant and searched the
house. They found further evidence of drugs and respondent
was indicted for possession of cocaine.
Respondent moved to suppress the evidence as products of
a warrantless search. The trial court denied the motion stating
that respondent’s wife had “common authority to consent to
the search.” The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed and the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, stating that “the consent to
conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occu-

Footnotes
1. 126 S.Ct. 1494 (2006).

2. 126 S.Ct. 1515 (2006).

n this term, as in the previous one, the United States
Supreme Court reasserted the rule of law in the context of
the detainees in the war on terror. At the same time, however, the addition of two new justices shifted the Court’s ideological balance to the right. In terms of criminal cases, the
Court handed down a mixed bag of decisions. It was a bad
term for Fourth Amendment claimants with the government
prevailing in four of five search-and-seizure cases. Outside the
context of the Fourth Amendment, however, criminal defendants fared a little better.
In this article, I review some of the Court’s decisions in the
criminal context. In a separate article, I review some of the
Court’s decisions in the civil context.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
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pant is not valid in the face of the refusal of another occupant
who is physically present at the scene to permit a warrantless
search.” The state supreme court found the case of United
States v. Matlock3 distinguishable because Matlock did not
address the scenario where the co-occupant was at the scene
and expressly denied consent to a search.
The Supreme Court agrees. Warrantless searches of a person’s house are “unreasonable per se” with “one jealously and
carefully drawn exception…consent of an individual possessing authority.” That consent can be given by “a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the
suspect is absent.” The Court does not believe, however, that
consent by a co-occupant to a warrantless search should
extend to situations where the householder is present and
refuses to give consent. As evident in Matlock, Fourth
Amendment rights are not limited by laws of property but are
heavily influenced by “widely shared social expectations.”
The Court starts with the assumption that without any recognized hierarchy, for example, a parent and child relationship,
there is no “common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes
of another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsiders.” It concludes that “the co-tenant wishing
to open the door to a third party has no recognized authority in
law or social practice to prevail over a present and objecting cotenant, his disputed invitation, without more, gives a police
officer no better claim to reasonableness in entering than the
officer would have in the absence of any consent at all.”
In light of its decision, the Court feels it must discuss
Matlock, where the tenant was in a squad car not far away, and
Illinois v. Rodriguez,4 where the tenant was asleep in his room.
The Court does not want to undercut the holdings in those
cases by its decision and admits it is drawing a fine line.
However, it finds this line justified. It adds that the police cannot remove the objector for the sake of avoiding a possible
objection, but that police are not required to seek out possible
objectors as this would be impractical and “would needlessly
limit the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field.”
Chief Justice Roberts dissents, stating that the “Court creates constitutional law by surmising what is typical when a
social guest encounters an entirely atypical situation.” He
believes the Court’s precedent clearly establishes that “[i]f an
individual shares information, papers, or places with another,
he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share
access to that information or those papers or places with the
government.” Under the Fourth Amendment, the test is
whether the search is unreasonable, not whether consent is
given. Justice Scalia also dissents. He argues that the issue is
not that neither the wife nor husband is master over the other,
but what to do when there is a “conflict between two equals.”
Justice Thomas, also dissenting, finds that Coolidge v. New
Hampshire5 is controlling in this case. In Coolidge, the Court
held that no Fourth Amendment search occurs where “the

spouse of an accused volunBrigham City v.
tarily leads the police to
Stewart . . . held
potential evidence of wrongdoing.”
that police have
In Brigham City v. Stuart,6
an objectively
a unanimous Court held that
reasonable basis
police have an objectively
reasonable basis for entering for entering a home
a home without a warrant
without a warrant
when they see an occupant
when they see an
of the home is seriously
occupant of the
injured or imminently
threatened with serious
home is seriously
injury. In Brigham, police
injured . . . .
responded to a call regarding
a loud party at a residence.
When they arrived, they heard shouting inside and proceeded
up the driveway to investigate. They saw two juveniles drinking beer in the backyard and, through the screen door and windows, saw an altercation between four adults and one juvenile
taking place in the kitchen. The police opened the door to the
kitchen and announced their presence. Nobody noticed so the
police entered the kitchen and announced their presence
again. Respondents were arrested and charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, disorderly conduct, and
intoxication. Respondents moved to suppress all evidence
arguing that the warrantless entry violated the Fourth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “in light of differences
among state courts and the Courts of Appeals concerning the
appropriate Fourth Amendment standard governing warrantless entry by law enforcement in an emergency situation.”
While warrantless searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable, “the exigencies of the situation” may
make “the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.” One exigency “is the need to assist persons who
are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” The
Court reiterates that when determining if an emergency situation exists, making warrantless entry reasonable, the circumstances must be viewed objectively. In this case, “the officers
were confronted with ongoing violence within the home.” The
Court believes that “the officers had an objectively reasonable
basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help
and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning.”
The Court also concludes that the “manner of the officers’
entry was also reasonable.” In these circumstances, the officer’s announcement after he opened the door but prior to
entering was equivalent to and satisfied the knock-andannounce rule. The Court states, “once the announcement
was made, the officers were free to enter; it would serve no
purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting
a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their
presence.”

3. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
4. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).

5. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
6. 126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006).
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Samson v. California
. . . held that the
Fourth Amendment
does not bar a
police officer from
conducting a
suspicionless search
of a parolee.

Justice Stevens filed a
short concurrence in which
he calls this “an odd flyspeck of a case.” He writes
that the only difficult question is what is “most peculiar”: (1) that the state
courts found a Fourth
Amendment violation; (2)
that the case was pursued
all the way to the Supreme
Court; or (3) that the Court

granted certiorari.
The Court held in Hudson v. Michigan7 that exclusion is not
a remedy for violation of the knock-and-announce rule.
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a five-member majority
and an opinion in part. Justice Kennedy concurred in part and
in the judgment, while Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, dissented.
In this case, police obtained a warrant to search petitioner’s
home for drugs and firearms. When they arrived, the police
announced their presence but only waited about three to five
seconds before entering. Petitioner moved to exclude the evidence found during the search, “arguing that the premature
entry violated his Fourth Amendment rights.” The trial court
granted the motion, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed.
Hudson was convicted and renewed his claim on appeal.
Since respondent concedes a violation of the knock-andannounce rule, the Court focuses only on a remedy for the violation. The Court writes that “[s]uppression of evidence...has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” It is
“applicable only where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served,…that is, where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.” The Court clarifies
its approach by stating that “exclusion may not be premised on
the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a ‘but-for’
cause of obtaining evidence.” Instead, the more appropriate
question in such a case is “whether granting establishment of
the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection
is made, has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or
instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.” This attenuation can occur when the
causal connection is remote and, “even given a direct causal
connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.”
The warrant requirement shields individuals and their property from government scrutiny. The Court has held that
“[e]xclusion of the evidence obtained by a warrantless search
vindicates that entitlement.” However, the Court believes the
interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement
are different. The latter protects human life and limb, “because
an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed selfdefense by the surprised resident,” property from being

7. 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006).
8. 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006).
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destroyed by a destructive entry, and “those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance,”
for example, by giving individuals time to dress. It concludes
that applying the exclusionary rule to a violation of the knockand-announce rule does not vindicate these interests.
In addition, the Court believes the deterrence benefits do
not outweigh the social costs. It finds the costs here considerable. The costs include not only “the grave adverse consequences that exclusion of relevant incriminating evidence
always entails,” but also would result in a flood of challenges
regarding alleged failures to follow the rule. In addition, the
Court believes that applying the exclusionary rule would result
in police “refraining from timely entry,” which may result in
such things as violence against officers or destruction of evidence. At the same time, the Court concludes that the “deterrence benefits” do not amount to much. While a violation of
the knock-and-announce rule might occasionally lead to the
discovery of otherwise undiscoverable evidence, ignoring the
rule primarily achieves nothing other than “the prevention of
destruction of evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening
resistance by occupants of the premises–dangers which, if
there is even ‘reasonable suspicion’ of their existence, suspend
the knock-and-announce requirement anyway.”
Justice Breyer dissents because the Court’s opinion
“destroys the strongest legal incentive to comply with the
Constitution’s knock-and-announce requirement.” Justice
Breyer also believes the majority opinion is a significant departure from the Court’s precedent, and “weakens, perhaps
destroys, much of the practical value of the Constitution’s
knock-and-announce protection.”
In Samson v. California,8 a 6-3 Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Thomas, held the Fourth Amendment does not bar
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a
parolee. Petitioner was on parole in California when he was
stopped and searched without a warrant or probable cause.
The search was conducted pursuant to California Penal Code
section 3067(a), which authorizes a warrantless and suspicionless search of a parolee. The officer conducting the search
found a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine and petitioner was charged with possession. The trial court denied
petitioner’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding that section 3067(a) “authorized the search and that the search was
not arbitrary or capricious.” Petitioner was convicted and the
conviction was affirmed on appeal.
The Court begins by conducting a Fourth Amendment
analysis, examining the “‘totality of the circumstances’ to
determine whether a search is reasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.” The Court states, “[w]hether a
search is reasonable is determined by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” The Court
mentions that it recently applied this approach in United State
v. Knights,9 where it determined that a California law subject-

9. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

ing a probationer to a warrantless search was reasonable. In
Knights, the Court determined (1) that a probationer’s expectation of privacy was significantly diminished due to his status
as a probationer, and (2) that the law was necessary to promote
legitimate governmental interests, mainly the dual interests of
“integrating probationers back into the community and combating recidivism.”
Applying the same analysis, the Court believes that a
parolee has even less of an expectation of privacy than a probationer because parolees “are on the continuum of stateimposed punishments.” In addition, the Court finds salient, as
it did in Knights, that “the parole search condition under
California law…was clearly expressed to petitioner;” he
“signed an order submitting to the condition and thus was
unambiguously aware of it.” The Court also finds, as it did in
Knights, that the state’s interests are substantial. The state’s
interests in reducing recidivism and promoting reintegration in
society “warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise
be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment.” The Court looks
at empirical evidence regarding recidivism to support its conclusion.
SIXTH AMENDMENT

In Washington v. Recuenco,10 Justice Thomas delivered the
opinion of a 7-2 Court, which held that a Blakely error is subject to a harmless-error analysis. Respondent threatened his
wife with a handgun. He was charged with second-degree
assault, which is defined under Washington law as “intentional
assault…with a deadly weapon.” The trial court used a special-verdict form “that directed the jury to make a specific finding whether respondent was armed with a deadly weapon at
the time of the commission of the crime.” There was nothing
on the form, however, that identified the deadly weapon as a
handgun. The jury returned a guilty verdict. At sentencing,
the trial court determined that respondent qualified for, and
imposed, the three-year firearm enhancement instead of the
one-year deadly weapon enhancement.
Before the Washington Supreme Court heard respondent’s
appeal, the Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey11
and Blakely v. Washington.12 In Apprendi, the Court held that,
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Blakely,
the Court held that “the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on
the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
by the defendant.” The Washington Supreme Court held that
a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. It also determined
that a harmless-error analysis did not apply.
The Court states that it has “repeatedly recognized that the
commission of a constitutional error at trial alone does not enti-

10. 126 S.Ct. 2546 (2006).
11. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
12. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
13. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).

tle a defendant to automatic
Washington v.
reversal.” Only a “structural”
error, an error that “necessarily Recuenco . . . held
renders a criminal trial fundathat a Blakely
mentally unfair or an unreliable error is subject to
vehicle for determining guilt or
a harmless-error
innocence,” requires automatic
reversal. Relying on its decianalysis.
sion in Neder v. United States,13
the Court concludes that a Blakely error is not a structural error.
In Neder, the district court failed to instruct the jury on an element of the crime. The Court held that a harmless-error analysis applied “because an instruction that omits an element of the
offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or
innocence.” The Court believes this case is indistinguishable
from Neder because its decision in Apprendi makes clear that
elements of a crime and sentencing factors are “treated the same
for Sixth Amendment purposes.”
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens believes that even if the Court had the power to
decide this case, there was no reason it should since the
Washington Supreme Court can set its own standards for this
type of error. He also states that the Court did not address
respondent’s strongest argument: “that Blakely errors are structural because they deprive criminal defendants of sufficient
notice regarding the charges they must defend against.” Justice
Ginsburg believes that no error occurred during trial. The
prosecutor proceeded under the theory of assault with a deadly
weapon and the jury rendered a guilty verdict as requested.
According to Justice Ginsburg, “[t]he harmless-error doctrine
was not designed to allow dislodgment of that error-free jury
determination.”
In Davis v. Washington,14 the Court considered the companion cases of Davis v. Washington15 and Hammon v. Indiana.16 An
8-1 Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, held that
statements made during a 911 call are non-testimonial, and not
covered by the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
when objective circumstances show that the interrogation by
police is necessary to assist in an ongoing emergency. However,
statements made to the police are testimonial when there is no
ongoing emergency and objective circumstances show the primary purpose of the interrogation is to gather evidence for
later criminal prosecution.
In Davis, Michelle McCottry made numerous statements to
a 911 operator who had determined that McCottry was
involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend,
Adrian Davis. McCottry did not testify at Davis’s trial so, to
establish McCottry’s injuries were caused by Davis, the prosecution, over Davis’s objections, used the 911 tapes. Davis was
convicted and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.
In Hammon, police responded to a reported domestic dis-

14. 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
15. No. 05-5224.
16. No. 05-5705.
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turbance call.
Amy
Hammon admitted and
signed an affidavit to the
effect that her husband
physically assaulted her.
Amy did not testify at trial
and, over petitioner’s
objections, an officer testified to what Amy told him
that night and authenticated Amy’s affidavit.
Petitioner was convicted
and his conviction was
affirmed on appeal. The
Indiana Supreme Court
determined that “Amy’s
statement was admissible
for state-law purposes as
an excited utterance” and
was not testimonial under Sixth Amendment standards. It did,
however, determine that the affidavit was testimonial and inadmissible, but found its erroneous admission harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides: “In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v.
Washington,17 the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
A critical component of this holding is the definition of “testimonial statements” because the Confrontation Clause only
applies to witnesses who make testimonial statements. In
Crawford, the Court identifies “statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations” as testimonial. However,
the Court did not have to establish what kind of police interrogations produce testimony.
Without producing an “exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements,” the Court holds that “[s]tatements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency.” However, statements are testimonial “when the circumstances objectively indicate that
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” In
Crawford, the Court recognized that the Confrontation Clause
“applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused–in other words,
those who bear testimony.” In turn, “[t]estimony,…is typically
a solemn declaration of affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.” Therefore, an “accuser
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark
to an acquaintance does not.”

As to a 911 call, the Court believes it “is ordinarily not
designed primarily to ‘establish or prove’ some past fact, but to
describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.”
The Court views McCottry’s statements as speaking to events
as they occurred and that McCottry was facing an ongoing
emergency. In addition, the Court concludes that, viewed
objectively, “the elicited statements were necessary to be able
to resolve the present emergency.” The Court concludes that
while a 911 call may become testimonial, “the circumstances
of McCottry’s interrogation objectively indicate its primary
purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.” She was not a “witness” or in the act of “testifying.”
As to Hammon, the Court believes the statements are “not
much different from the statements we found to be testimonial
in Crawford.” The Court writes, “[i]t is entirely clear from the
circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged.” While it is true that the
interrogation in Crawford was much more formal, that difference only makes it more objectively apparent that the statements obtained were testimonial in nature; it does not change
the characterization of the statements made in Hammon.
Although the Court implicitly rejects the Indiana Supreme
Court’s implication that “virtually any initial inquiries at the
crime scene will not be testimonial…[it] do[es] not hold the
opposite—that no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers.” As the Court already indicated, the police
might need to obtain answers to “assess the situation, the
threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential
victim.”
Justice Thomas concurs in the judgment in part and dissents in part. He believes that the Court has adopted a test as
equally unpredictable as that abandoned by Crawford. Instead
of requiring courts to divine the primary purpose of police
interrogations, Justice Thomas would focus instead on what
type of statements qualify as testimonial: those include “extrajudicial statements…contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confession.” He believes that neither the 911 call nor the statements made by Amy to the police are testimonial.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,18 Justice Scalia, writing
for a 5-4 Court, held that the denial of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to private counsel based on the erroneous
disqualification of counsel requires automatic reversal.
Respondent was charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana. His family hired John Fahle to represent him. After the
arraignment, respondent hired Joseph Low, an attorney from
California. The trial court denied Low’s numerous motions for
admission pro hoc vice on the grounds that Low violated Rule
4-4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from contacting a represented
client directly without consent of counsel. The district court
determined that Low’s contact with respondent was made
without consent by Fahle. During trial, respondent was represented by local counsel Karl Dickhause and was convicted.

17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

18. 126 S.Ct. 2557 (2006).

“Statements are
nontestimonial when
made in the
course of police
interrogation under
circumstances
objectively indicating
that the primary
purpose . . . is to
enable police
assistance to meet
an ongoing
emergency.”

26 Court Review

The Eighth Circuit reversed after it determined that the district court erred in interpreting Rule 4-4.2. It then concluded
that because of this error, the district court “violated respondent’s Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing.”
It held that the violation was not subject to harmless-error
review. The Supreme Court agrees.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the
right to counsel. The Court has previously interpreted this
guarantee as including “the right of a defendant who does not
require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.”
The Court does not believe, as argued by the government,
“that the Sixth Amendment violation is not ‘complete’ unless
the defendant can show that substitute counsel was ineffective
within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington,19—i.e., that
substitute counsel’s performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by it.” Nor does it believe “that the defendant must at least demonstrate that his counsel of choice
would have pursued a different strategy that would have created a reasonable probability that…the result of the proceedings would have been different.” The Court writes that “the
Government’s argument in effect reads the Sixth Amendment
as a more detailed version of the Due Process Clause—and
then proceeds to give no effect to the details.” The purpose of
the Sixth Amendment is ultimately to provide a fair trial; however, “it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so
long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”
Following this same line of reasoning, the Court also held
that this error is not subject to review for harmlessness. The
Court cites to Arizona v. Fulminante,20 where it divided constitutional errors into two classes: (1) “‘trial error,’ because the
errors occurred during presentation of the case to the jury and
their effect may be quantitatively assessed in the context of
other evidence presented in order to determine whether [they
were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (2) “structural defects” that “defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards
because they affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, and are not simply an error in the trial process itself.”
The Court has little difficulty in concluding that the deprivation of counsel of one’s choice is a structural error. The Court
again rejects the government’s attempt to compare this type of
error with ineffective assistance of counsel.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT

In Oregon v. Guzek,21 the Court determined that the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments do not provide a criminal defendant with the right to introduce new evidence of innocence at
a sentencing hearing. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of
the Court while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, filed
an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito took no
part in the decision.
Respondent was convicted of capital murder and sentenced
to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the

19. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
20. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
21. 126 S.Ct. 1226 (2006).
22. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

conviction but remanded
Oregon v. Guzek . . .
for a new sentencing heardetermined that
ing. Guzek was sentenced
to death two more times
the Eighth and
and each time the Oregon
Fourteenth
Supreme Court ordered a
new sentencing hearing. Amendments do not
When the case was before
provide a criminal
it a fourth time, the
defendant with the
Oregon Supreme Court,
right to introduce
“[s]eeking to avoid further
new evidence of
errors…also addressed the
admissibility of certain eviinnocence at a
dence Guzek [sought] to
sentencing hearing.
introduce at that proceeding, including live testimony from his mother about his alibi.” This type of evidence
falls into the category of “residual doubt” evidence as it goes
toward whether the defendant committed the crime as
opposed to his or her role in the crime. The Oregon Supreme
Court held “that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce this evidence at his upcoming sentencing proceeding.”
The Supreme Court does not agree. The Court distinguishes the cases relied on by the Oregon Supreme Court. In
Lockett v. Ohio,22 the plurality determined that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require introduction of evidence
related to “any aspect of defendant’s character or record and
any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death.” This statement was
adopted by the majority in Eddings v. Oklahoma.23 The Court
states that Lockett is distinguishable from the case before it
because in Lockett the evidence “tended to show how, not
whether, the defendant committed the crime. Nor was the evidence directly inconsistent with the jury’s finding of guilt.”
The Court also points out that, contrary to the Oregon
Supreme Court’s understanding, its decision in Green v.
Georgia24 does not undermine this factual distinction. That
opinion “focused only upon the hearsay problem, and it
implicitly assumed that, in the absence of the hearsay problem,
state law would not have blocked admission of the evidence.”
Regardless, the Court concludes that its subsequent opinion,
Franklin v. Lynaugh,25 made “clear, contrary to the Oregon
Supreme Court’s understanding, that this Court’s previous
cases had not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as providing
a capital defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast ‘residual doubt’ on his guilt.”
The Court in Franklin did not determine whether the
Eighth Amendment required a trial court to allow residualdoubt evidence to be introduced during a sentencing hearing.
Instead, the plurality held that “the sentencing scheme at issue
was constitutional even if such a right existed.” The Court

23. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
24. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
25. 487 U.S. 164 (1988).
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makes the same determination here: even if an Eighth
Amendment right does exist,
“it could not extend so far as
to provide this defendant with
a right to introduce the evidence at issue.” The Eighth
Amendment only requires: (1)
“reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”; and (2) “that a sentencing jury be able to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence.” According
to the Court, “the Eighth
Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set
reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit,
and to control the manner in which it is submitted.”

Holmes v. South
Carolina . . . held
that a rule barring
the admission of
evidence that a
third-party
committed the
crime cannot
rest on the
strength of the
prosecution’s case.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Justice Alito wrote for a unanimous Court in Holmes v. South
Carolina,26 which held that a rule barring the admission of evidence that a third-party committed the crime cannot rest on
the strength of the prosecution’s case. Petitioner was convicted
for murder, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree
burglary, and robbery. He was sentenced to death and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner received a new trial
after successful post-conviction review. At the second trial,
petitioner sought to undermine the prosecution’s case by
showing that the evidence was contaminated and the police
were trying to frame him. As part of this, petitioner introduced
the testimony of expert witnesses and evidence that a third
party committed the crime.
The trial court excluded petitioner’s third-party guilt evidence, citing State v. Gregory,27 which states that such evidence
is admissible if it “raises a reasonable inference or presumption
as to [the defendant’s] own innocence” but is inadmissible if it
merely “casts a bare suspicion upon another” or “raises a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another.” The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where strong evidence of an appellant’s guilt exists—
especially strong forensic evidence—evidence of a third party’s
guilt “does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant’s
own innocence.”
The Court begins by recognizing the constitutional broad
latitude afforded to state and federal rulemakers to enact rules
excluding evidence from criminal trials. However, this latitude
is limited by a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete
defense. The Court does not specify from where this limitation
stems but recognizes that it may arise from the “Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory
Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.” A

26. 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006).
27. 198 S.C. 98 (1941).
28. 126 S.Ct. 2709 (2006).
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defendant’s right to present a complete defense is undercut by
evidentiary rules that “infringe upon a weighty interest of the
accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve.”
The Court provides examples from previous cases where it
held that a defendant’s right to present a full defense was violated. It writes that although the Constitution prohibits rules
that exclude evidence and which “serve no legitimate purpose
or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted
to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial
judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed
by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of
issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” For instance, evidence
that another individual committed the crime may be regulated
under these principles if the evidence is inconsistent with a
defendant’s guilt and do not raise a reasonable inference or presumption as to the defendant’s innocence. However, South
Carolina attempted to extend this type of rule.
The Court criticizes South Carolina’s approach because the
trial judge does not weigh the probative value or potential
adverse effects of admitting the third-party guilt evidence, and
instead the critical analysis turns on the strength of the prosecution’s case. Further, this approach “seems to call for little, if
any, examination of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses or the reliability of its evidence.” The Court concludes
that this rule “does not rationally serve the end that the
Gregory rule and its analogues in other jurisdictions were
designed to promote, i.e., to focus the trial on the central issues
by excluding evidence that has only a very weak logical connection to the central issues.”
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court in Clark v.
Arizona,28 which held that a state does not violate the Due
Process Clause by limiting evidence of insanity to the insanity
defense and excluding its admission to rebut mens rea. Justice
Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, filed a dissenting opinion.
Petitioner Eric Clark killed a police officer. Clark was
charged with first-degree murder and “did not contest the
shooting or death, but relied on his undisputed paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the incident in denying that he had the
specific intent to shoot a law enforcement officer or knowledge
that he was doing so, as required by the statute.” He wanted
to present the evidence of mental illness in two ways: (1) as an
affirmative defense; and (2) to rebut the prosecutor’s evidence
of the requisite mens rea. The trial court held that Clark could
not use evidence of his mental illness to dispute the mens rea.
It relied on State v. Mott,29 which “refused to allow psychiatric
testimony to negate specific intent,…and held that Arizona
does not allow evidence of a defendant’s mental disorder short
of insanity…to negate the mens rea element of a crime.” The
Court of Appeals of Arizona affirmed and the Arizona Supreme
Court denied further review.

29. 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1234
(1997).

When Arizona first codified the insanity rule, it adopted the
“landmark English rule in M’Naghten’s Case,” which provides
that a party is not guilty by reason of insanity if “the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the
act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.” In 1993, however, Arizona
modified its insanity rule and dropped the cognitive-incapacity portion. Thus, under current law, “a defendant will not be
adjudged insane unless he demonstrates that at the time of the
commission of the criminal act [he] was afflicted with a mental disease or defect of such severity that [he] did not know the
criminal act was wrong.” The Court rejects Clark’s argument
that the M’Naghten test “represents the minimum that a government must provide in recognizing an alternative to criminal
responsibility on grounds of mental illness or defect.”
The Court also rejects Clark’s alleged due-process violation
based on the Arizona Supreme Court’s adoption of the rule in
Mott. The Court believes that Clark’s argument “turns on the
application of the presumption of innocence in criminal cases,
the presumption of sanity, and the principle that a criminal
defendant is entitled to present relevant and favorable evidence
on an element of the offense charged against him.” As to the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution must prove each
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, including the
mens rea. The presumption of sanity is “equally universal in
some variety or other, being (at least) a presumption that a
defendant has the capacity to form the mens rea necessary.”
However, unlike the presumption of innocence, a state can
decide whether to allow a defendant to bring forth “evidence
of mental disease or incapacity for the bearing it can have on
the government’s burden to show mens rea” or may allow
insanity only to be raised as an affirmative defense. In these
instances, the burden is carried by the defendant and the state
may determine the extent of that burden.
Finally, the Court believes that Clark’s argument touches
upon the principle that a criminal defendant has the dueprocess right to “present evidence favorable to himself on an
element that must be proven to convict him.” This right may
be curtailed for good reason. The Court writes: “While the
Constitution…prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence
under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote,
well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain
other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or potential to mislead the jury.” The Court believes that
Arizona’s law channeling and restricting mental-disease and
capacity evidence satisfies the standard of fundamental fairness
required by due process. The Court concludes by stating that
Arizona has the “authority to define its presumption of sanity…by choosing an insanity definition…and by placing the
burden of persuasion on defendants who claim incapacity as
an excuse from customary criminal responsibility.”

In Dixon v. United
The Court held that
States,30 a 7-2 Court held
the Hobbs Act
that neither the Due Process
Clause nor modern common
only criminalizes
law requires the government
violence that is
to bear the burden of disrelated to robbery
proving duress. Petitioner
was indicted and convicted or extortion; it does
of “one count of receiving a
not criminalize
firearm while under indictfree-standing
ment…and eight counts of
physical violence.
making false statements in
connection with the acquisition of a firearm.” At trial, petitioner “admitted that she knew
she was under indictment when she made the purchases and
that she knew doing so was a crime; her defense was that she
acted under duress because her boyfriend threatened to kill her
or hurt her daughters if she did not buy the guns for him.” She
argued that “the Government should be required to disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt the duress.” The district court,
bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, denied the request and petitioner renewed her argument on appeal, claiming: (1) “her
defense controverted the mens rea required for conviction and
therefore that the Due Process Clause requires the Government
to retain the burden of persuasion on that element”; and (2)
“that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is contrary to modern common
law.”
The Supreme Court disagrees. The Court states: “[t]he
duress defense, like the defense of necessity…may excuse conduct that would otherwise be punishable, but the existence of
duress normally does not controvert any of the elements of the
offense itself.” In addition, the Court believes it bears repeating that under common law, the defendant had the burden of
proving an affirmative defense. The Court does not believe
that any recent developments, including its decision in Davis v.
United States,31 support a contrary conclusion.

30. 126 S.Ct. 2437 (2006).
31. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).

32. 126 S.Ct. 1264 (2006).

CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Scheidler v. NOW,32 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of
the Court in which all justices joined except Justice Alito, who
took no part in the decision. The Court held that the Hobbs Act
only criminalizes violence that is related to robbery or extortion; it does not criminalize free-standing physical violence.
Respondents brought an action against petitioners under
the Hobbs Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), claiming that petitioners’ protest
activities at abortion clinics amounted to extortion and “that
these extortionate acts created a pattern of racketeering activity.” The Hobbs Act, Title 18 of the United States Code, “says
that an individual commits a federal crime if he or she
‘obstructs, delays, or affects commerce’ by robbery, extortion,
or committing or threatening physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything
in violation of this section.”
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A jury found in favor of respondents and the district court
entered a nationwide injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed
but the Supreme Court reversed. It noted that the Hobbs Act
defines extortion “as necessarily including improper obtaining
property from another.” The Court did not agree that the
“claimed property consisted of a woman’s right to seek medical
services from a clinic, the right of the doctors, nurses or other
clinic staff to perform their jobs, and the right of the clinics to
provide medical services for free from wrongful threats, violence, coercion, and fear.” On remand, the Seventh Circuit did
not reverse the district court’s decision or terminate the injunction. Instead, it “considered respondents’ argument that the
jury’s RICO verdict rested not only upon many instances of
extortion-related conduct, but also upon four instances (or
threats) of physical violence unrelated to extortion.” Since this
theory was not presented in the district court, the Seventh
Circuit determined that the Court did not have a chance to
determine if these acts were sufficient to constitute a Hobbs
Act violation. The Seventh Circuit remanded, but the petitioners sought, and the Court granted, a writ of certiorari.
The Supreme Court believes the determinative question is
whether the phrase, “in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do
anything in violation of this section,” as used in the Hobbs Act,
refers to violence “(1) that furthers a plan or purpose to affect
commerce…by robbery or extortion, or to violence (2) that
furthers a plan or purpose simply to affect commerce.” The
Court chooses the former, more restrictive, reading for four
reasons. First, the Court believes the “more restrictive reading
[is] the more natural one” in light of the entire subparagraph.
Second, the Court finds support in the fact that “Congress
often intends such statutory terms as ‘affect commerce’ or ‘in
commerce’ to be read as terms of art connecting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the constitutional
provision (here, the Commerce Clause) that grants Congress
that authority.” Here, it provides a limit to what Congress
intended to define as criminal conduct. Third, the Court relies
on legislative history. Finally, the Court believes that the other
reading “broadens the Act’s scope well beyond what case law
has assumed” and “would federalize much ordinary criminal
behavior.”
In Zedner v. United States,33 Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that a criminal defendant may not
prospectively waive application of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974. He was joined by all the Members of the Court except
Justice Scalia who joined only in part and filed a separate opinion concurring in part and in the judgment.
Petitioner was indicted by a grand jury on seven counts of
attempting to defraud a financial institution and one count of
knowingly possessing counterfeit obligations of the United
States. After numerous continuances, the trial court requested
that petitioner waive his rights under the Act “for all time.”
The petitioner gave both an oral and written waiver. Due to
other delays, the trial did not start for another six years.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the charges for violation of the
Act, but the trial court denied the motion based on petitioner’s

33. 126 S.Ct. 1976 (2006).
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prospective waiver. Petitioner was convicted and the Second
Circuit affirmed. It determined that petitioner’s waiver may
have been ineffective; however, an exception exists “when
defendant’s conduct causes or contributes to a period of delay.”
The Court begins its opinion with a synopsis of the Act’s
provisions and purposes. The Act requires a trial to begin
within 70 days from the time the information or indictment is
filed or the defendant makes his initial appearance. The Act
also provides a “detailed list of periods of delay that are
excluded in computing the time within which the trial must
start.” Among these is an “ends-of-justice” continuance,
which “permits a district court to grant a continuance and to
exclude the resulting delay if the court, after considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the public’s
and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.”
The Court agrees with petitioner that he could not prospectively waive application of the Act. First, the Court notes that
the Act does not list as one of the categories of delay a period
during which the defendant waives application of the Act.
Instead, it specifically requires “that defense continuance
requests fit within one of the specific exclusions set out” in the
Act. Even the flexible “ends-of-justice” delay requires the district court to consider certain factors on the record. The Court
believes that if a “defendant could simply waive the application
of the Act whenever he or she wanted more time, no defendant
would ever need to put such considerations before the court
under the rubric of an ends-of-justice exclusion.”
Additionally, the Court believes that the “purposes of the Act
also cut against exclusion on the grounds of mere consent or
waiver.” The Act protects both a defendant’s rights and the
public’s interests in a speedy resolution; the latter cannot be
served if defendants can opt out of the Act.
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